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Executive Summary

Ransomware activity against industrial organizations escalated in Q3 2025, with manufacturing being the most affected sector, accounting for 72% of incidents. The threat stems from the exploitation of unsecured connections between Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT), driven by Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) affiliates and Initial Access Brokers (IABs). Dragos tracked 742 ransomware incidents globally in Q3 2025, with North America being the most targeted region. The ecosystem is characterized by a mix of mature RaaS operations and fragmented, low-discipline emerging groups that target IT systems supporting production workflows.
Established RaaS groups like Qilin remained highly active, influencing industrial targets, while LockBit attempted a resurgence through LockBit 5.0, though affiliate migration to other platforms indicated difficulty in reestablishing dominance due to law enforcement actions. Emerging groups such as Gentlemen and Sinobi demonstrated activity focused on IT systems that underpin manufacturing and supply chains, often leveraging compromised credentials obtained via IABs or phishing. Further incidents highlighted the capability of identity-focused intrusions, like Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters targeting ERP and cloud environments in the automotive and logistics sectors, demonstrating a credible path to indirect Operational Technology (OT) impact even without confirmed direct Industrial Control System (ICS) breaches.

Facts Only

* Dragos identified 742 ransomware incidents affecting industrial entities worldwide in Q3 2025, up from 708 in Q1 and 657 in Q2 2025.
* Manufacturing accounted for 532 incidents in Q3 2025, representing 72% of total activity.
* The top manufacturing subsector impacted was construction, with 142 incidents out of 532.
* The global electric/renewables sector saw an increase from 3 incidents in Q2 to 16 in Q3.
* Government organizations reported 35 incidents in Q3 2025, up from 4 in Q2 2025.
* Qilin reported 138 incidents in Q3 2025.
* Qilin, Akira, Play, and INC Ransom accounted for nearly 40% of activity across industrial organizations in Q3.
* Pakistan Petroleum Limited (PPL) experienced a ransomware intrusion on August 6, 2025.
* Data I/O Corporation disclosed a ransomware intrusion on August 16, 2025.
* Jaguar Land Rover (JLR) confirmed a cyber incident on September 1, 2025, disrupting manufacturing and retail operations for nearly five weeks.
* Collins Aerospace confirmed a cyber intrusion on September 19, 2025, impacting airport check-in systems.
* Asahi Group Holdings reported ransomware attacks causing system failures in factories in Japan on September 29, 2025.
* The North America region recorded 434 incidents in Q3 2025.
* The Europe region reported 162 incidents in Q3 2025.
* Asia documented 73 incidents in Q3 2025.
* The Middle East recorded 15 incidents in Q3 2025.
* Transportation and Logistics reported 36 incidents in Q3 2025.
* Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Equipment and Engineering experienced 52 incidents in Q3 2025.
* Manufacturing subsectors included Construction (142), Equipment (77), Food and Beverage (64), Electronics (50), Consumer Goods (34), Automotive (32), Healthcare Manufacturing (26), Chemical (17), Plastics (16), Pharmaceuticals (13), Metals & Textile (9 each), Aerospace & Semiconductor (8 each), Packaging (7), Paper (7), Defense Manufacturing (6), Glass (4), Maritime Manufacturing (3).
* Specific groups reported incidents: Qilin (138), Akira (94), Play (64), INC Ransom (51), Sinobi (23), Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters claimed an intrusion against JLR and a U.S. financial institution.

Full Take

The narrative of the industrial ransomware landscape in Q3 2025 reveals a critical tension between established, large-scale RaaS operations and the proliferation of low-maturity, agile actors operating within the operational technology (OT) supporting environments. The dominance of manufacturing incidents underscores that physical production continuity is the primary motivator for attackers, regardless of whether they directly access ICS networks; compromising the business layer—ERP, logistics, and engineering systems—achieves a functionally equivalent disruptive outcome. This suggests that the fragmentation described in the ecosystem does not simply lead to smaller threats but allows for systemic risk accumulation where low-skill actors can leverage the high-value data gathered by sophisticated affiliates.
The shift in focus from explicit ICS compromise to identity and enterprise system compromise, as seen with Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters targeting ERPs at JLR, suggests a strategic evolution. This operational pivot implies that attackers understand the difficulty and risk associated with direct OT access, opting instead for exploiting the interconnectedness of IT/OT infrastructure supported by cloud services and centralized credentials. The persistence of specialized groups like Qilin, which demonstrated deep knowledge of exploiting specific vendor vulnerabilities (Fortinet CVEs), confirms that sophisticated threats remain highly effective when paired with affiliate momentum.
The dynamic surrounding LockBit's attempted comeback illustrates a structural truth: operational capacity is dependent on established supply chains, not just brand recognition. When enforcement actions disrupt these external structures, the resulting fragmentation allows for rapid, low-overhead reorganization among affiliates, demonstrating that pressure on high-level infrastructure forces diffusion rather than extinction. The overall implication for industrial resilience is that security investments must focus less on perimeter defense and more on securing the identity fabric—credentials, access controls, and the integrity of the application layer—because this layer represents the most accessible leverage point across the entire value chain.
Bridge Questions:
How should organizations quantify the risk associated with exploiting IT/ERP systems when operational continuity is tied to OT?
If fragmentation allows for low-maturity groups to cause significant impact, what governance structures are necessary to monitor and manage these emerging threat vectors alongside established RaaS groups?
What tangible measures can be implemented to prevent the migration of affiliate activity away from law enforcement-scrutinized platforms?

From the original · Dragos (OT security)

Industrial organizations play a crucial role in global supply chains and critical infrastructure. They are facing escalating risks as Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) affiliates and Initial Access Brokers (IABs) continue to focus on organizations with the lowest tolerance for downtime and refine their tactics.
Read the full story at dragos.com

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Dragos Industrial Ransomware Analysis: Q3 2025 | Huntaegis