Image: isc.sans.edu · rights & removal
A phishing page interested in MX records, (Tue, Nov 17th)
Reporting by SANS Internet Storm CenterRead the original at isc.sans.edu
Executive Summary
Facts Only
* A phishing page was linked from a message to an HTML page hosted on Google Cloud Storage.
* The recipient's email address was included in the URL fragment of the link: `hxxps[:]//storage[.]googleapis[.]com/alx2/03/1a/we.html#[recipiente-mailaddress]`.
* The page presented a generic login form personalized with the victim's email domain.
* The page attempted to use the thum.io service to retrieve a screenshot of the victim's organization's website as a background.
* The DNS-over-HTTPS query for MX records was performed using Google's public DNS service against the victim's email domain.
* The retrieved MX record results were included in the information sent to the attacker with stolen credentials.
* The credential harvesting kit collected the submitted password, visitor's public IP address, geographic location, browser information, and language.
* The collected data was transmitted to the attacker using the Telegram Bot API.
* A separate phishing page examined concurrently also collected a similar set of information and sent it via Telegram.
* Infoblox documented a phishing-as-a-service operation called Morphing Meerkat in March 2025, which used DNS-over-HTTPS queries for MX records.
Full Take
The scenario illustrates a sophisticated layering of reconnaissance during credential harvesting, moving beyond simple data exfiltration to infrastructure mapping. The inclusion of MX record lookups serves not just as an additive data point but as an automated method for the attacker to map the victim's entire email service provider ecosystem. While the specific phishing page did not use these records to customize the interface directly—unlike some services—the fact that the raw DNS query and result were bundled with credentials indicates a playbook focused on creating highly contextualized, high-value intelligence packets. This suggests an intent to provide the attacker with immediate context about where the compromised accounts reside, prioritizing subsequent attacks or negotiations. The observation that this technique mirrors documented phishing-as-a-service operations reinforces the idea that automated reconnaissance is becoming standard practice for threat actors, shifting the focus from purely transactional theft to comprehensive infrastructure profiling. The implication is that attackers are integrating passive reconnaissance into the very mechanism of data collection to maximize the utility of stolen credentials.
Bridge Questions:
How does the existence of readily available public DNS data change the risk assessment when an attacker integrates it into a phishing delivery mechanism? What countermeasures can be implemented against automated, multi-stage intelligence gathering embedded within credential flows? What is the long-term impact on organizational security awareness when attackers routinely include infrastructural data in malicious communications?
From the original · SANS Internet Storm Center
A phishing page interested in MX records I’ve mentioned before in some of my diaries that it can be instructive to look at what appear to be “generic” phishing messages in detail from time to time, since some of them might prove not to be as generic as they initially appear.Read the full story at isc.sans.edu
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