Image: web-assets.esetstatic.com · rights & removal
MythicRatatoskr: An Yggdrasil-enabled backdoor deployed in a UAC
Reporting by ESET WeLiveSecurityRead the original at welivesecurity.com
Executive Summary
Facts Only
July 16, 2025: UAC-0099 gained initial access to a grain logistics company in Ukraine via spearphishing leading to MATCHWOK execution.
July 17, 2025: MythicRatatoskr backdoor was deployed, communicating with a C&C server hosted inside the Yggdrasil mesh network.
Two months later (approx. September 17, 2025): Sandworm conducted a data-wiping attack using SDelete deployed via Active Directory Group Policy on the compromised company.
MythicRatatoskr is written in Go and utilizes Yggdrasil, an experimental decentralized IPv6 mesh network for end-to-end protected traffic exchange.
The operational handoff occurred between UAC-0099 and Sandworm at some point during the intrusion timeline.
UAC-0099 targets Ukrainian governmental organizations, financial institutions, and media; its targeting suggests alignment with Russian interests.
Sandworm is attributed to GRU Unit 74455 and is known for destructive attacks in Ukraine.
MythicRatatoskr persistence mechanisms include starting as a Windows service named ieupdate.
The C&C communication uses JSON-encoded HTTP POST requests over HTTPS on port 443 within the Yggdrasil network.
Full Take
The narrative strongly presents a chain reaction: access brokers facilitating destructive outcomes, creating a high-stakes industrial espionage/sabotage nexus. The strength of this analysis lies in meticulously documenting the operational handover between two distinct but presumed Russian-aligned entities—UAC-0099 and Sandworm—demonstrating that advanced initial footholds can transition directly into highly destructive phases. The introduction of MythicRatatoskr leverages a sophisticated, low-observability communication layer (Yggdrasil), which fundamentally challenges conventional perimeter defense models by pushing C&C outside traditional centralized infrastructure points. This technique echoes historical patterns where actors leverage novel or experimental technologies to increase operational resilience against state-level monitoring.
The central assumption being tested is whether this coordination signals a maturation of cyber warfare doctrine among state sponsors, moving beyond isolated operations toward layered integration between espionage and kinetic/destructive actions. However, the report simultaneously couches its conclusions in carefully managed uncertainty regarding who operated MythicRatatoskr—UAC-0099 or Sandworm—preventing an overstatement of complete operational control by any single entity.
The pattern observed here is the institutionalization of 'access brokering' in state cyber operations: one group specializes in stealthy infiltration (UAC-0099/MATCHWOK), and another performs strategic impact (Sandworm/SDelete). The employment of Yggdrasil acts as a highly advanced form of operational obfuscation, shifting the focus from 'how they communicated' to 'where their network physically exists.'
Patterns detected: none
What are the systemic pressures driving state actors to integrate experimental decentralized networking into established attack chains? If C&C resilience is achieved via infrastructure novelty (like Yggdrasil), what does this imply for the future viability of traditional threat intelligence models focused on fixed IOCs and known server locations? How do defenders architect solutions that detect traffic patterns across resilient P2P overlays without resorting to blunt network blocking, which itself may alert sophisticated operators?
From the original · ESET WeLiveSecurity
Executive summary This report analyzes activity during which UAC‑0099 gained initial access on July 16th, 2025 and handed it off to Sandworm, which then conducted a data-wiping attack on September 17th, 2025. It particularly focuses on the MythicRatatoskr backdoor, which is unique in its use of the Yggdrasil mesh network to communicate with a C&C server hosted within it.Read the full story at welivesecurity.com
