ATT&CK-based detection for a federal agency is the practice of deploying detection rules mapped to MITRE ATT&CK techniques, translating those rules to the agency’s own SIEM, and measuring coverage so the agency can produce auditable evidence that detection is working.
Federal agencies operate under executive orders, OMB memos, and performance goals that point to one operational outcome: detect adversary techniques against agency telemetry and produce evidence that detection is working.
Three components deliver that outcome. An ATT&CK-mapped detection content source provides the rules. A translation layer converts each rule to the native query language of the agency’s deployed SIEM, whether that is Microsoft Sentinel, Splunk, or Elastic. A coverage measurement loop proves which ATT&CK techniques are covered, which are not, and when coverage was last validated.
Without all three, an agency has either detection it cannot prove or proof it cannot act on. This page maps federal guidance to detection requirements and gives a federal buyer the questions to ask any detection content vendor.
What tools help implement ATT&CK-based detection quickly in a federal agency?
Three tool categories implement ATT&CK-based detection in a federal agency: a detection content source, a translation layer, and a coverage measurement loop. Each can come from a vendor, from open source, or from internal engineering. A federal buyer should evaluate each independently because each can come from a different provider.
| Component | Function | Neutral examples |
|---|---|---|
| ATT&CK-mapped detection content source | Pre-written detection rules, each mapped to a MITRE ATT&CK technique | SOC Prime Prime Hunt, Sigma community rules, CISA detection signatures, native content packs from Microsoft Sentinel, Splunk, Elastic |
| Translation layer | Converts detection logic to the query language the agency’s SIEM runs | SOC Prime Uncoder, Sigma CLI, manual rule porting |
| Coverage measurement loop | Maps which ATT&CK techniques have deployed, validated detections and which have gaps | MITRE ATT&CK Navigator, custom ATT&CK heatmaps, vendor coverage dashboards |
A content source alone is not detection capability, and a translation tool alone is not coverage. The measurement loop connects the two to evidence an auditor or inspector general can verify.
Detection content source. A library of rules mapped to MITRE ATT&CK technique IDs, authored and maintained at a cadence that keeps pace with published threat activity. Sources include internal detection engineering teams writing rules in Sigma, vendor-supplied content streams such as SOC Prime‘s detection content platform, the open-source Sigma rule community, and MITRE’s own ATT&CK repository.
Translation layer. Converts rules from a portable format into the native query syntax of the agency’s SIEM. For Microsoft Sentinel that means KQL. For Splunk, SPL. For Elastic, KQL or EQL. SOC Prime’s Uncoder handles this translation across platforms. Manual conversion and platform-native import tools are alternatives, though they carry a per-rule labor cost that compounds as rule volume grows.
Coverage measurement loop. Maps deployed rules back to the ATT&CK matrix and identifies technique gaps. MITRE’s ATT&CK Navigator is a free, widely used tool for this visualization. The loop is where the five evidence classes an inspector general looks for originate.
Those five evidence classes are the through-line of this page.
| # | Evidence class | What it proves |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Log sources collected | Which telemetry is ingested, from which systems, and that collection is continuous |
| 2 | Rules deployed | Each detection rule mapped to its ATT&CK technique and the obligation it supports, with a named owner |
| 3 | Proof of firing | Rules fired on real or emulated events and alerts reached responders |
| 4 | Change history | Who changed a rule, when, and why, with version control and a review trail |
| 5 | Dated coverage report | Point-in-time coverage with a date, so trend and currency are provable |
A vendor may provide the content source and the translation layer. The measurement loop often requires the agency to configure its own reporting from ATT&CK Navigator exports, SIEM dashboards, or third-party coverage analytics. The measurement loop is the component agencies most commonly lack.
Prime Hunt’s read-only data audit maps the log sources an agency already collects to ATT&CK and lists the techniques with no telemetry behind them.
How does CISA and NSA threat-informed defense guidance translate into detection requirements?
Federal guidance prescribes outcomes, not specific detection tools. CISA, often jointly with NSA, publishes advisories and guidance that define what agencies must achieve in detection and monitoring. Mapping each guidance document to the detection capability it implies, and then to the evidence that capability produces, gives a program manager a traceable line from directive to operational proof.
| Guidance | Implied detection capability | Evidence class |
|---|---|---|
| OMB M-26-14 (22 May 2026, rescinds M-21-31) | Log collection measured per information system on a five-level logging maturity model, Level 0 to Level 4 | Log sources collected |
| EO 14144 (16 January 2025) as amended by EO 14306 (6 June 2025) | Threat identification across the federal enterprise: CISA threat hunting and agency endpoint detection and response data (EO 14144 Sec. 3(c), redesignated Sec. 3(a) by EO 14306) | Rules deployed, proof of firing |
| CISA Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping (v2.0, January 2023) and the Decider tool | Structured ATT&CK technique attribution on deployed detections | Rules deployed (ATT&CK-mapped) |
| CISA Cross-Sector CPG 2.0 (11 December 2025) | Baseline performance goals for detection and response, including the Govern function added in version 2.0 | Rules deployed, dated coverage report |
| NIST SP 800-61 Rev 3 (final, 3 April 2025, CSF 2.0 community profile) | Detect-to-respond evidence chain per CSF 2.0 | Proof of firing, change history |
| CISA/NSA joint cybersecurity advisories | ATT&CK technique coverage against named threat actors and campaigns | Rules deployed against named techniques |
One line carries the whole table: threat-informed defense guidance implies ATT&CK-mapped detections deployed against the agency’s own telemetry, and the five evidence classes prove the capability exists.
The OMB memo of 22 May 2026 replaced the M-21-31 EL0 through EL3 maturity tiers with a revised logging and visibility framework. The memo directed CISA to produce a Logging Reference Architecture under the new framework. Agencies that built logging programs around the old tiers should validate current posture against the 2026 memo.
MITRE ATT&CK is not mandated by any of these directives. It organizes the evidence so that coverage is measurable and technique gaps are nameable across all of them. A federal buyer who can produce the five evidence classes is defensible regardless of which specific directive applies.
How do you close APT technique gaps when cleared detection engineers cannot be hired fast enough?
Buy the commodity detection layer. Build the agency-specific layer.
Why federal detection hiring lags
Detection engineering in a federal agency carries constraints commercial teams do not face. Clearance requirements narrow the hiring pool. Onboarding timelines extend before a new hire touches production systems. Attrition forces a re-hire and re-ramp cycle that compounds the delay.
Source the commodity layer
Commodity TTPs, the techniques shared across APT groups and criminal actors on common platforms, are published by threat researchers and translated across SIEM platforms by vendor-agnostic content sources. An agency running Microsoft Sentinel, Splunk, or Elastic Security across different mission areas can source pre-written, pre-mapped detection logic for commodity techniques rather than authoring each rule in each query language.
Where cleared engineers add value
The agency’s cleared engineers then focus on what only they can do:
- Detection logic against classified threat intelligence and agency-specific telemetry.
- Tuning sourced content against the agency’s log sources and baseline behavior. Pre-written content produces false positives until tuned to the environment.
- Validation. Every rule, bought or built, requires proof of firing in the agency’s own environment before it counts as deployed. A rule that parses is not a rule that fires.
- Operational response. Detection without response is a dashboard. Cleared analysts investigate, contain, and remediate.
A subscription to a detection content source converts part of a variable hiring problem into a fixed operating expense, redirecting headcount to investigation, environment-specific tuning, validation, and incident response rather than re-creating detections the broader community has already written and tested.
Content sourcing augments detection engineering capacity. It does not replace cleared personnel and does not remove the need for validation and tuning. Any vendor claim that content sourcing removes the validation step deserves scrutiny.
How fast should an advisory become a deployed detection?
Measure the time from a CISA or NSA advisory to a validated, firing detection in the agency’s own SIEM. That window is the metric, and every federal agency should be able to report it for its most recent advisories. For comparison, SOC Prime publishes a 24-hour SLA for detection content against emerging threats.
| Step | Action | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Advisory published (CISA, NSA, or sector ISAC) | External |
| 2 | Detection logic authored or sourced covering named ATT&CK techniques | Content source or internal engineer |
| 3 | Rule translated to the agency’s SIEM query language and deployed | Translation layer or internal engineer |
| 4 | Rule validated: proof of firing against emulated or real events | Agency (always) |
The window has three segments:
- A rule is authored or sourced for the technique the advisory names.
- The rule is translated into the native query language of the agency’s SIEM.
- The rule is validated against the agency’s telemetry to confirm it fires and does not produce unacceptable false-positive volume.
Each segment is independently measurable, and the bottleneck varies by agency. Some source rules quickly but lack translation capacity for their specific SIEM dialect. Others translate quickly but lack validation infrastructure.
A detection content vendor compresses steps 2 and 3. Step 4 remains the agency’s responsibility regardless of content origin. A buyer evaluating any vendor’s speed claim should ask which of these three segments the stated timeline covers and which it does not.
Track the full window per advisory. Set an agency target. Report against it. Each advisory produces a dated record: advisory ID, techniques covered, detection rule IDs, date deployed, date validated. That record is auditable and demonstrates that the agency’s threat-informed defense posture is current.
What should a federal buyer ask a detection content vendor about deployment model, data handling and supply chain?
These questions apply to every detection content vendor, including SOC Prime. The answers are diligence inputs, not marketing differentiators.
Deployment model
| Ask | Why it matters |
|---|---|
| What is the hosting model? Cloud, on-premises, hybrid? | Determines whether the platform can operate within the agency’s network boundary |
| What network connectivity does the platform require? | Outbound connectivity requirements affect placement in segmented or restricted networks |
| What access does the platform require to the agency’s SIEM or log infrastructure? | Access scope sets the blast radius if the vendor is compromised |
| How are detection content updates delivered and applied? | Push vs. pull, frequency, and the integrity mechanism on updates |
Data handling
| Ask | Why it matters |
|---|---|
| What data does the platform process? Detection content only, or agency telemetry? | Determines the data classification the platform must handle |
| Does the platform require raw log data, or does it operate on metadata alone? | Narrows the sensitivity of what the vendor can touch |
| Where is data processed and stored? What jurisdiction? | Affects data sovereignty and records-management requirements |
| How is the agency’s data segregated from other customers? | Multi-tenancy architecture determines whether cross-tenant exposure is possible |
Supply chain and provenance
| Ask | Why it matters |
|---|---|
| How is detection content authored? By whom? What vetting applies to contributors? | Source of the rules determines trust level and exposure to supply-chain risk |
| What review and validation process does content pass before delivery? | False-positive rate and detection quality depend on upstream QA |
| What provenance record travels with each detection rule? | Traceability from deployed rule to author and review record |
| Does the vendor publish a software bill of materials? | SBOM availability is a supply-chain transparency baseline |
Neutral frameworks for evaluating vendor responses: NIST SP 800-161 Rev. 1 Update 1 (cybersecurity supply-chain risk management), SBOM minimum elements, and CISA’s Secure Software Development Attestation Form, which remains available although OMB M-26-05 (23 January 2026) rescinded the government-wide requirement to collect it.
Authorization posture
| Ask | Why it matters |
|---|---|
| FedRAMP authorization status and impact level? | Determines whether the platform can process federal data at the required impact level |
| Agency-specific authorization to operate? | An ATO granted by another agency is informational, not transferable |
A buyer should verify authorization status directly through the FedRAMP marketplace or the authorizing agency rather than relying on vendor statements alone.
Update cadence and lifecycle
| Ask | Why it matters |
|---|---|
| How frequently is new detection content published? | Currency of coverage against emerging techniques |
| What is the timeline from technique publication to available detection, and which segments does it cover? | Scopes a vendor’s speed claim against the advisory-to-detection window above |
| How does the vendor retire or update outdated rules? | Rule lifecycle hygiene and drift control |
| What notification does the customer receive when a deployed rule changes? | Change-control visibility for the agency’s own audit trail |
These questions are due diligence. A vendor that cannot answer them clearly is a risk the agency accepts without measurement.
Where this does not hold
This page addresses unclassified federal environments with standard network connectivity.
Out of scope:
| Environment | Why it is excluded |
|---|---|
| Classified networks | Detection content sourcing in classified environments requires capabilities not verified for any vendor named on this page |
| Air-gapped or disconnected operations | No vendor’s ability to deliver detection content in disconnected environments is asserted here |
| Agency-unique telemetry | Agencies with telemetry sources outside standard SIEM log parsing may require detection logic no external content source provides |
Agencies operating under environment-specific accreditation such as IL4, IL5, or IL6 impact levels under DoD should validate any vendor’s authorization status against the specific accreditation their environment requires. The buyer questions in the previous section still apply, but the thresholds for acceptable answers are higher.
The three-component model (content source, translation layer, measurement loop) applies in every environment. Whether a specific vendor can deliver in a classified or disconnected environment is a question the buyer verifies directly with the vendor and with the authorizing official.
FAQ
What tools can help implement ATT&CK-based detection quickly in a federal agency?
Three tool categories: an ATT&CK-mapped detection content source, a translation layer that converts rules to the agency’s SIEM query language, and a coverage measurement loop that maps deployed detections to ATT&CK techniques. Each can be vendor-supplied, open source, or built in-house. The measurement loop is the component agencies most commonly lack.
Can community-sourced detection content be trusted in a federal environment?
Trust depends on three factors: provenance (who authored the rule and under what vetting), review (what validation the rule passed before delivery), and validation in the agency’s own environment (proof the rule fires against the agency’s telemetry without unacceptable false positives). A rule’s origin is a risk input, not a disqualifier. Federal buyers should ask every vendor, including community-sourced platforms, what provenance record travels with each rule.
What evidence does an inspector general look for in a federal detection program?
Five evidence classes: log sources collected (which telemetry is ingested and that collection is continuous), rules deployed (each mapped to an ATT&CK technique and obligation with a named owner), proof of firing (rules fired on real or emulated events and alerts reached responders), change history (who changed a rule, when, and why), and a dated coverage report (point-in-time coverage with a date so trend is provable).
How should a federal agency measure the time from a CISA advisory to a deployed detection?
Track four steps per advisory: advisory published, detection logic authored or sourced, rule translated and deployed to the agency’s SIEM, and rule validated with proof of firing. Set an agency target for the full window. Record each advisory’s ID, techniques covered, rule IDs, date deployed, and date validated. That record is auditable.
Is MITRE ATT&CK required by federal cybersecurity directives?
No federal directive mandates MITRE ATT&CK by name. ATT&CK organizes detection evidence so coverage is measurable and technique gaps are nameable across directives. A federal buyer who can produce the five evidence classes (log sources, rules deployed, proof of firing, change history, dated coverage) is defensible against audits regardless of which directive applies.
A MITRE ATT&CK Audit by SOC Prime’s engineers assesses visibility and detection capability across the agency’s SIEM or EDR and returns the gaps with recommendations.
Related reading
- From Raw Threat Reports to Actionable Defense: AI-Powered Deep Threat Research (September 2026)
- MITRE Attack Flow v3.0.0 (October 2025)
- Uncoder AI Automates MITRE ATT&CK Tagging in Sigma Rules (April 2025)