Introduction
Torrent trackers have long been abused for distributing malicious software, disguised as popular films, games, and other content. Our previous research has shown that cybercriminals repeatedly turn to torrents as an initial infection vector, using trojanized cracks and installers to reach a large number of users. Installation guides for pirated software routinely instruct users to disable their antivirus, conditioning them to ignore the potential threats they are inviting onto their computers.
During our analysis of malware that leverages blockchain networks for its C2 infrastructure, we discovered a previously unknown modular, multi-stage framework that we dubbed MovieReaper. This report details the new crimeware campaign that began with the mass infection of users via compromised torrent tracker file storage. We have identified several hundred victims, including both individual users and organizations in multiple countries, such as Russia, Türkiye, Japan, Kenya, Uganda, and Colombia, as well as in several European countries like Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany. We analyze the techniques for evading detection by security and sandbox solutions, and examine the capabilities of the modular framework.
Kaspersky products detect this threat as HEUR:Trojan.Win64.Agent.gen.
Technical details
Background
In mid‑August 2026, during our threat‑hunting efforts, we identified a large‑scale infection campaign involving previously unknown malware disguised as popular movies. The campaign affected both individuals and organizations across multiple countries. Our initial analysis revealed a common denominator: all of the victims had used torrent trackers. This finding prompted us to investigate the campaign further and analyze its distribution mechanism, overall scope, and unknown malware implants.
Initial infection and spread
Compromised torrent trackers are the primary vector used to distribute malware. During our investigation, we identified multiple user reports describing suspicious files being downloaded instead of the intended content.
For example, a user of a popular movie torrent tracker reported the following case on Reddit:
Further analysis of the attack revealed that instead of compromising torrent trackers, the threat actor modified a widely used public repository of torrent files, itorrents[.]org
. As a result, the trackers that relied on the repository began inadvertently distributing malicious torrent files to their users. This approach is particularly dangerous because it lets the threat actor reach users of multiple trackers without having to compromise each platform individually.
As of the publication date of this report, the archive remains compromised. When a user attempts to download a torrent via a magnet link, the legitimate torrent archive returns a different torrent file. This malicious torrent leads to the download of the malware loader, used to deploy a framework that we dubbed MovieReaper.
The loader initiates the infection chain shown in the diagram below. Each stage of the chain is described in detail in the following sections.
Malware implants
The infection chain consists of several steps, where only the initial one is dropped on the disk before it is executed to avoid detection. The malware itself is not heavily obfuscated, apart from strings being encrypted with a custom stream cipher. Most of the countermeasures were aimed at avoiding detection by AV sandboxes.
Step 1: Loader
The most popular initial executable was distributed through torrent trackers under many different names (for example, the odyssey (2026) [1080p] [webrip] [5.1].exe
), but the file hash (MD5: A0B13781EDD7CFDAB13D79AFFF3C83C1
) was identical across all downloads. We have seen multiple different loaders, where the executable file disguises itself with a long filename and an icon of some well-known application. Most of the filenames are rather long, presumably to hide the EXE extension at the end.
After the user manually starts the application, it establishes a global mutex to ensure that only one loader is executed at a time. We have seen several mutex variations in our samples, containing a randomly generated string (in the example Global\fnulSktzSqvVLXHU
). This executable then performs a series of operations in order to avoid detection by AV sandbox solutions.
While performing those operations, the malware avoids making LoadLibrary
and GetProcAddress
calls to acquire the addresses of required functions. Instead, it searches for loaded libraries by traversing the double-linked list taken from the Ldr field of the PEB and then performs manual parsing of the loaded DLL to calculate the function address.
After all initial checks have passed, the binary prepares to establish a network connection to a C2 web server to download the shellcode, map it to the RWX memory and execute. While doing so, the loader decodes the domain name https://deadhub[.]org
and if connection to it has failed, it uses the IP address http://193.23.118[.]155
as a fallback and connects to it using plain HTTP. The malware chooses a random group of strings and uses them as a path in the HTTP request to download the parts of the shellcode.
Example URLs:
/cloud/v192.4/ui/sync-status-icons.png
/cloud/v192.4/onboarding/welcome-bg.jpg
/cloud/v192.4/ui/file-preview-placeholder.png
/cloud/v192.4/shared/link-banner.jpg
While mapping the address space and executing the shellcode, the loader registers a vectored exception handler and rewrites the handler address in memory in order to perform a debug break. This, will not crash the program, but instead redirect controlflow to the function that actually makes a raw NtProtectVirtualMemory
syscall (via a previously located “0x0F 0x05” syscall instruction inside ntdll
). Then it calls the undocumented ntdll
function EtwpCreateEtwThread
, which is a popular alternative to CreateThread
for code executionm, and executes the shellcode.
Step 2: Shellcode
The second stage of this malware performs an HTTPS request to the Solana blockchain at the endpoint /getAccountInfo
endpoint for the account 6pnDGAiHgyPdmckM5Qt1YbanGzrX43WLEU159nRaNLDm
. The data in field of the response contains the base64‑encoded address of a second C2, which is encrypted with a static XOR key located within the shellcode itself. To store data in this account, attackers used a simple Solana program (address: CSiY8bQLBYPdfPWkwipBzH6sijTVQVVsA279JQdvwHtL
).
Utilizing the Solana blockchain as a storage layer for next-stage C2 endpoints substantially complicates infrastructure takedown efforts by defenders.
The second stage payload communicates with its C2 server strictly through HTTPS via a TLS-pinned certificate using the nanopb protobuf library as a container for transferred data. The main logic of the stage 2 implant contains several initial commands, where the most important is the one that parses the COFF file, loads it into memory, and executes the module_init
function from it. This provides a convenient interface for extension of the command list, which brings us to the next stage of the payload.
Step 3: UAC Bypass and persistence
Notably, the recovered modules were compiled with symbols, which accelerated reverse engineering.
After receiving the next stage from the second C2 server, the newly loaded module performs several tasks right in the module_init
function.
Stage 3 performs UAC Bypass and achieves persistence using public techniques, masquerades the original binary as C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Telemetry\msedge.exe
, and restarts itself.
The respawned process starts with the initial loader, but with a special command-line argument, which allows it to skip most of the anti-sandboxing checks and proceed straight to downloading the next payload. The executable proceeds with the same steps as before, but this time, instead of downloading the persistence and UAC bypass module, a new one is downloaded from the second C2 server. This is because the malware uses the beacon to send a flag to the remote server, indicating whether the implant is running from the Telemetry folder, which allows the C2 to distinguish between first-run and respawned instances.
Step 4: The final implant
The final module (“file manager”) exposes 21 commands that give the operator filesystem access on the victim host. This allows remote the operator to download, upload, and read files on the system; list and enumerate directories; manipulate files with create, copy, rename, move, delete, chmod, and symlink commands; and use preview and thumbnail commands to exfiltrate previews of images and files before actually extracting them.
We suspect that other modules may be loaded on demand if requested by the operator.
Infrastructure
During this malware campaign, attackers are using various commercial hosting providers for their C2 infrastructure (see the IoC section for details). Furthermore, as noted above, the campaign leverages the legitimate Solana blockchain via the RPC endpoint api.mainnet.solana.com
to deliver the address of the second‑stage C2 server to the malware. This approach provides the attackers with decentralized storage for C2 addresses, adding an additional layer of resilience and making it more difficult for defenders to disrupt the campaign by simply blocking the IP addresses of the C2 servers.
Victims
The observed campaign targeted both individuals and organizations across Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America, with infection attempts identified in Russia, Spain, Germany, Finland, Türkiye, Japan, Nepal, Kenya, Tanzania, Ghana, Uganda, Colombia, the Netherlands, Belgium, and other countries. The targeted organizations span a wide range of sectors, including enterprise, government, IT, consulting, retail, transportation, and agriculture.
Conclusions
Our research uncovered activity by the same actor dating back to October 2025. Although the campaign has evolved over time, with the malware authors expanding their arsenal and making the loader harder to detect, the pattern remains the same. This includes encoded strings, parts of shellcode downloaded through plain HTTP, and several techniques used to avoid sandboxes and virtual machines. We will continue monitoring this actor’s activity to catch new potential threats.
The first stage offers the clearest opportunity to disrupt this campaign: it relies on a single specific domain name and a single IP address to serve the shellcode, so taking down this server would prevent subsequent infection stages. This includes the second-stage payload, which uses the Solana blockchain network for a C2 and is therefore more resistant to conventional infrastructure takedowns.
However, this framework’s self-containment, modularity and in-memory execution has potential for reuse in later campaigns with minimal rework.
Indicators of compromise
File hashes
4334BBAEA8DE33BF9D45E9B4E4E3BC2
4843F9FAFCAE492F11E2D4D33DBB4CDD
5310CABAE3FBE6DB8742849B588093F9
A0B13781EDD7CFDAB13D79AFFF3C83C1
70060341CAF3338697A7DDFE0FB62875
AD4643EEA15AC286FA47D1131F9EF756
D0B967571AC8A3863C7F324BF5BDE99C
D88D550D0FB8E60CFFFF3EA61FF7A067
File paths
%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\Telemetry\msedge.exe
Mutexes
Global\E4AyDKzvEhe2hgAr
Global\fnulSktzSqvVLXHU
Domains and IPs
First-stage C2:
deadhub[.]org
193.23.118[.]155
Second-stage C2:
208.64.33[.]90
208.94.246[.]53
The Odyssey and Trojans again: MovieReaper attacks users in multiple countries through compromised torrents
Artem
Not surprised that cybercriminals prey on this topic … The Odyssey was one of the most anticipated movies of 2026 and another of Nolan’s masterpieces. It became his highest-grossing film. But my heart is with Tenet.