Predator, Pegasus and Graphite: Governments Accused of Spyware Abuse Face Little Accountability

Investigations into the use of sophisticated spyware like Predator and Pegasus have exposed a troubling pattern across Europe, characterized by widespread surveillance targeting activists, politicians, and journalists, yet lacking significant criminal accountability outside of Greece. The initial revelations began in 2021 with findings regarding NSO Group’s Pegasus software used against European figures. While courts in Athens recently convicted executives linked to Predator spyware—including a former Israeli military intelligence commander—this is noted as a rare occurrence. In contrast, victims across Spain and Hungary report severe limitations in seeking redress, often citing "national security" as the barrier.
Experts describe this situation as double victimization: experiencing extreme invasive technology followed by an institutional dead end when pursuing justice. Although the European Parliament issued recommendations post-Pegasus scandal—suggesting EU funding for victims and enhanced safeguards—subsequent reporting suggests these mechanisms have stalled. Cases in other countries involve complex legal maneuvering, where governmental justifications for surveillance clash with civil liberties concerns regarding political opposition or advocacy work concerning migration and human rights abuses.

Thanasis Koukakis, a Greek journalist, was targeted by Predator spyware that accessed his contacts, documents, messages, camera, and microphone over nearly five years.
In Athens, a court convicted four executives linked to Intellexa (maker of Predator), including founder Tal Dilian, facing up to eight years in prison for illegal computer access and privacy violations.
The surveillance scandal began in 2021 when Forbidden Stories revealed European targets of NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware.
Citizen Lab identified Italian phone numbers targeted by Paragon Solutions in 2025.
In Spain and Hungary, victims report authorities cite "national security" to prevent disclosure regarding surveillance.
Rebecca White, Amnesty International researcher, terms the judicial difficulty "double victimization."
Polish MEP Krzysztof Brejza experienced Pegasus infection while campaigning against Poland's Law and Justice party; attackers allegedly altered 85,000 messages across ten years.
In October 2026, a Polish parliamentary inquiry concluded Pegasus was unlawfully procured and used against political opponents.
Greek authorities deny using Predator, citing lack of regulation at the time.
Szabolcs Panyi in Hungary learned he was spied on with Pegasus for seven months in 2019; requests for information have been blocked on security grounds.

The central narrative presented is a crisis of digital accountability, where state or quasi-state technological power—represented by spyware firms and their users—operates with near impunity across Europe. The strongest interpretation suggests that national security doctrines are currently functioning as an effective legal shield against democratic scrutiny, turning sophisticated surveillance tools into mechanisms of political insulation rather than counter-terrorism aid. The Greek conviction serves as a crucial localized exception, while the lack of convictions elsewhere suggests systemic divergence in how democracies process digital evidence versus asserting sovereign secrecy.
The pattern detected here is **ARC-0121 Institutional Inertia**, where high-level legislative recommendations (like those from the European Parliament) fail to translate into material policy shifts when confronted by established governmental claims of national security. The narrative structure subtly employs a juxtaposition: placing concrete legal victories in Greece against prolonged, stalled processes in Spain and Hungary. This highlights the disparity between *legal possibility* and *practical attainability*.
The underlying paradigm driving this situation is the privatization and subsequent state-capture of surveillance technology, transforming tools originally designed for specific threats into instruments capable of systematic political interference—as evidenced by Brejza’s case manipulation. The implication is a fundamental erosion of human agency where private citizens become mere data points whose rights can be overridden under abstract security mandates.
What are the long-term institutional costs when legal recourse becomes an exhaustingly protracted, psychologically damaging exercise rather than a direct route to truth? How might technical solutions—like mandating supply chain transparency for surveillance tools—be practically enforced against sovereign state interests? If accountability is dependent on extraordinary judicial persistence, is that standard justice or perpetual resistance?
Patterns detected: none
Autonomy check: No autonomy signals.