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The fridge hack UK supermarkets narrowly avoided?
Reporting by Pen Test PartnersRead the original at pentestpartners.com
Executive Summary
Facts Only
* UK supermarkets were not affected by the Danfoss incident due to different equipment popularity.
* Vulnerabilities were found in controllers from RDM, not Danfoss.
* Multiple supermarkets, retailers, and supply chain operators were exposed.
* Efforts were made in November to remove refrigeration controllers from the internet or place them on private networks.
* Vulnerability disclosure from RDM failed to provide details on attacker capabilities or validation of fixes.
* Omega Solutions and Pen Test Partners, along with NCSC, RDM, and others collaborated on mitigation.
* New firmware was released by RDM to address issues.
* Exposed controllers were located using Shodan and operators were contacted for remediation.
* Remediation actions were taken quickly, and some systems were placed on private networks or behind VPNs.
Full Take
The narrative highlights a critical divergence in risk based on specific technological adoption rather than universal exposure. The contrast between the French incident (Danfoss) and the UK situation (RDM) underscores how vendor choice interacts with external threat landscapes, suggesting that systemic risk is mediated by the specific hardware deployed in an environment. The failure of the initial vulnerability disclosure demonstrates a gap in manufacturer responsibility regarding supply chain notification and validation, even when collaborating with external bodies. Furthermore, the successful mitigation depended heavily on cross-sector collaboration—involving independent researchers, government agencies (NCSC), industry bodies (BRC), and manufacturers—which suggests that robust defense against complex vulnerabilities requires decentralized, multi-stakeholder pressure rather than relying solely on vendor disclosures or internal security efforts. The process of finding and neutralizing the exposure through Shodan and direct engagement illustrates a pragmatic response to asymmetric information flow in critical infrastructure security.
Bridge Questions: If RDM had adhered to more stringent disclosure standards initially, how would this have altered the timeline for mitigation? What are the long-term mechanisms required to ensure that future vulnerability disclosures mandate transparent, actionable validation from the outset?
From the original · Pen Test Partners
TL;DR - UK supermarkets weren’t affected by the Danfoss incident as in France and elsewhere, as a different manufacturer is popular here. - These controllers, from a firm called RDM, have a related vulnerability, though not identical. - Multiple supermarkets, retailers and supply chain operators were exposed. - Huge efforts were made during November to ensure that refrigeration controllers in UK…Read the full story at pentestpartners.com
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