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Executive Summary

Logistics operations are targeted through cyberattacks exploiting routine business processes like carrier verification, broker onboarding, and document exchange. Three distinct campaigns were investigated: HelloFriends, NodeRemote, and Fake Freight Portals, all leveraging phishing and malware distribution techniques against the US trucking and logistics sector. HelloFriends impersonated official services to harvest sensitive data such as SSNs, EINs, and payment credentials by mimicking portals for SAFER and Motus. NodeRemote distributed malware via fraudulent broker documents, establishing persistent backdoors using PowerShell/VBS scripts, scheduled tasks, and C2 communication through rotated relay infrastructure. Fake Freight Portals used malicious WebDAV shortcuts to deliver remote access agents like MeshCentral and CastleRAT, which were observed exfiltrating data and attempting privilege escalation such as accessing BitLocker recovery keys. The findings emphasize that successful defense requires understanding the entire attack chain—from initial phishing and credential harvesting through to establishing persistent remote control within the logistics environment.

Facts Only

* HelloFriends used phishing emails impersonating FMCSA, using sender addresses at dotcompanyinfo[.]com.
* Phishing links led to fraudulent SAFER or Motus portals.
* Victims were asked to provide SSNs, EINs, date of birth, and contact details, along with a supposed $300 administrative fee.
* HelloFriends infrastructure used Next.js applications on Vercel to submit data via endpoints like /api/send-telegram.
* NodeRemote distributed malware through fake broker onboarding pages and documents.
* Infection chains deployed PowerShell or VBS scripts to retrieve components from attacker infrastructure, including Cloudflare Workers endpoints.
* NodeRemote established persistence using scheduled tasks named NodeRemote{GUID} or NodeRemoteWebServer-.
* The malware communicated relay information via a main.js backdoor retrieving data from BNB Smart Chain contracts, DNS-over-HTTPS, and GitHub gists, cached in lastknownrelays.json.
* Fake Freight Portals used malicious WebDAV shortcuts to deliver terms\and\conditions.pdf.lnk, which executed terms\and\conditions.exe.
* The installation resulted in the deployment of a MeshCentral agent and CastleRAT, which attempted to retrieve BitLocker recovery passwords.
* IOCs include dotcompanyinfo[.]com, /api/send-telegram, NodeRemote, and various C2 endpoints like 87.120.104[.]213:1010.

Full Take

The existence of these campaigns demonstrates a systemic risk rooted in the trust inherent within logistics workflows. The attackers are not merely looking for credentials; they are exploiting the high volume and procedural regularity of document exchange—carrier verification, freight booking, and broker communication—to embed malware and establish deep persistence. The key pattern is the exploitation of legitimate business tools (SAFERS, Motus, DAT portals, MeshCentral) as vectors for malicious payload delivery. This challenges traditional perimeter-focused defenses, necessitating a shift toward behavioral monitoring within enterprise systems.
The attack progression from simple credential theft (HelloFriends) to persistent remote control (NodeRemote and Fake Freight Portals) reveals an escalation strategy. Attackers leverage the initial breach to achieve deeper access by installing legitimate management tools like MeshCentral, masking malicious activity within authorized processes. Furthermore, the use of dynamic C2 infrastructure rotation, discovered through blockchain and DNS methods in NodeRemote, indicates a sophisticated operational security designed to evade static IOC blocking.
The most critical implication for SOC/MSSP teams is that surface-level indicators are insufficient. The observable behavior shifts from file reputation to process interaction (e.g., WebDAV execution), configuration changes (e.g., BitLocker access), and communication patterns (e.g., internal telemetry endpoints). The capability of tools like Interactive Sandbox to reveal these granular execution chains, combined with context-aware threat intelligence, bridges the gap between raw alerts and actionable defense. The challenge lies in developing detection logic that recognizes legitimate software acting maliciously within a known logistical context, rather than focusing solely on unknown files.
Bridge Questions: How can security architecture be redesigned to inherently trust operational workflow integrity, rather than relying solely on endpoint signatures? What organizational changes are required to effectively manage the high-volume data exchange necessary for logistics operations while maintaining security posture? If threat intelligence is being delivered via TI Feeds, how should organizations prioritize integrating behavioral context over raw indicator volume in their detection pipelines?

From the original · Any.run Blog

American trucking and logistics companies rely on digital platforms to verify carriers, onboard brokers, exchange documents, and coordinate freight. Cybercriminals increasingly exploit these routine business processes.
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Fake FMCSA, DAT, and TIMOCOM Portals: 3 Cyberattacks Targeting US Logistics | Huntaegis