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Attackers Abuse ChatGPT Custom GPTs to Deliver RAT via ClickFix
Reporting by Huntress LabsRead the original at huntress.com
Executive Summary
Facts Only
Special thanks were given to Tanner Filip, Camilo Lima, Ethan Williams, Ryan Eisenhower, Jose Oregon, Jai Minton, Susannah Matt, and Lindsey Welch for contributions to the investigation.
Attackers used a Custom GPT instance as a lure.
The lure involved a Google Sites link that delivered a ClickFix attack.
The ClickFix attack led to the download and execution of a malicious MSI installer.
The MSI deployed a legitimate, Canon-signed application (COTFileReadApp.exe) to sideload a malicious DLL.
The infection chain involved PowerShell executing an obfuscated script to download and run an MSI.
The MSI installed persistence mechanisms named "Canon Configuration Reader" via a Run key and a scheduled task.
The payload included shellcode decoded from encrypted WAV files, which executed AMSI bypass techniques.
The final stage involves unpacking an encrypted file system archive (monitor.raw) containing a RAT.
The RAT capabilities include remote desktop sessions, screen broadcasting, camera/microphone capture, and file system search across the host.
Indicators of Compromise include specific filenames and hashes related to loaders, DLLs, and the RAT components.
Full Take
The consistent evolution of this threat highlights a critical vulnerability: the systemic trust placed in legitimate, interactive AI features for social engineering is being weaponized against users. The progression from exploiting a Custom GPT lure to utilizing Google Sites for a ClickFix attack demonstrates an understanding of leveraging layered platforms—AI services, search engine advertising, and public website hosting—to create a multi-stage deception that bypasses single-point security controls. The analysis of the malware chain reveals a deliberate focus on evading automated detection; the use of steganography in audio files for shellcode delivery and the creation of custom, dynamically named persistence mechanisms points toward an actor group operating with modular, adaptable tooling rather than static malware. This pattern suggests a mature campaign where the core malicious functionality (the RAT) remains consistent, while the delivery mechanism—the "costume" involving host software substitutions like Canon versus Stardock applications and evolving steganographic methods—is continuously refreshed to evade signature-based defenses. The ultimate implication is that resilience requires looking beyond known malware signatures to analyze the architectural flow of trust across digital services.
Bridge Questions: How can defensive strategies shift focus from blocking known attack signatures to monitoring the behavioral sequences within legitimate application interactions? What systemic changes are needed in how AI platforms manage and secure user-generated custom content? How can institutions establish real-time correlation across disparate platform telemetry to anticipate multi-stage social engineering attacks?
From the original · Huntress Labs
Acknowledgements: Special thanks to Tanner Filip, Camilo Lima, Ethan Williams, Ryan Eisenhower, Jose Oregon, Jai Minton, Susannah Matt, and Lindsey Welch for their contributions to this investigation and writeup.Read the full story at huntress.com
Sentinel — Human
The text presents a highly detailed forensic breakdown of a sophisticated cyberattack chain exploiting AI platform features. The structure demonstrates deep technical expertise typical of threat intelligence reporting, rather than generic AI-generated synthesis.
