Was it worth it for Israel to purchase the Drakon Submarine and other vessels?
Should Israel have made the purchase in 2012, when Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu approved it? Or should it have occurred only after other items, which the Israeli defense establishment was eyeing, were purchased?
More pertinent is another question: Did Netanyahu's concealment of the deal from most of the defense establishment endanger national security and foreign relations? And, just as importantly, why did he hide these transactions?
These are the questions that Case 3000 has been trying to dissect since 2021. Recently, they returned to headlines as the inquiry nears the final stage of its hearings, set for November 1. Notably, the Drakon Submarine arrived in Israel this past Thursday.
The answer to Question Number One – was it worth it for Israel? – is a resounding yes, as far as the Israel Navy is concerned. The navy believes that Israel needs every single one of the submarines it currently has, including the Drakon.
Navy pressing for more submarine approvals, Netanyahu was forward-looking
The navy later ordered more submarines (the Dakar-class), with deliveries starting in 2031. Currently, the navy is pressing the government to approve the purchase of two more new submarines that are not on its list.
If it goes through, this move will increase Israel’s submarine fleet from six to eight (some of the submarines currently in use are set to be retired).
It is no coincidence that the navy is pushing for more submarines right now. Currently, Turkey is moving to 14 submarines, and disputes over the Straits of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab have geopolitical impact.
In that regard, Netanyahu made a sound judgment about both the navy’s and the country’s needs, whether for the right reasons or not. However, that is only part of the inquiry.
It’s true that the navy always wanted more submarines. But both the navy and the defense establishment had another priority: greater numbers of armored vehicles to protect soldiers from ambushes in Gaza and Lebanon. At the time, Netanyahu rejected their wishes.
Even if one argued that the navy needed more submarines, the defense establishment may have been right in 2012, when they wanted Netanyahu to approve the purchase of more armored vehicles first.
There is some proof that the Israeli defense establishment was right in this dispute. During the 50-day conflict with Hamas in 2014, many of the IDF’s casualties came from driving in vehicles that were hit by Hamas’s rocket-propelled grenades or anti-tank weapons. If these soldiers had been driving in the armored vehicles purchased in 2012, they might have lived.
Netanyahu only approved of buying more armored vehicles after the 2014 conflict and public outrage over the IDF’s casualties.
I must emphasize how complex this situation truly is. Even if Netanyahu was right that Israel needed submarines, he may have bought them at the wrong time. Perhaps he should have prioritized the armored vehicles first.
However, Netanyahu could argue that Germany may have either hiked prices or stopped production if Israel hadn't locked in the deals when it did.
Some reports indicate that Netanyahu approved of Germany selling submarines to Egypt because Germany said that, without more sales, it may have to close certain production sites. Other reports indicate that Netanyahu saved millions of dollars in German purchases by green-lighting Germany’s deal with Egypt.
Regrettably, Netanyahu has not come forward with all of the case’s details, and he may withhold them during the state inquiry.
Netanyahu hid motives from defense establishment, opposition
This brings us to another question: Why did Netanyahu keep the situation top-secret, and why does he continue to do so to this day?
This story has another twist. Netanyahu hid his moves from the defense establishment because he knew they opposed him. He feared a devastating political battle that would likely cost him.
Alternatively, Netanyahu wanted to take sole credit for the submarine’s arrival and eventual victories. It’s also likely that he doesn’t like working within the system, or else prefers to operate in secret with his personal underlings.
While some would call it admirable that Netanyahu is eager to skip the red tape, his tendency to act outside the system carries great risk.
When Netanyahu approved Egypt’s purchase of German submarines, Hosni Mubarak was Egypt’s president. However, on June 24, 2012, Mohammed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood shocked the world by winning the Egyptian election and taking power. He held power until July 3, 2013, and by then, the damage was already done. After that, many worried Egypt could no longer be trusted.
If Netanyahu had publicized these deals, it would have been politically embarrassing for him. Critics would highlight him as the man who approved submarines for the Muslim Brotherhood, even if Morsi was removed before Egypt was sent the submarines.
Netanyahu may have had another reason for hiding his movements; he may have been trying to obscure his connections to his cousin, Natan Milikovsky, who was involved in aspects of the naval deals.
He could also have been trying to hide his connections to some of his top associates, who were later indicted for their actions. Although the state prosecution found that they could not build a criminal case on any of these issues, that doesn’t mean Netanyahu wasn’t concerned about them.
Numerous reports over the last decade or so have shown that Netanyahu’s secrecy caused problems for both top Israeli officials and the IDF. Over this past weekend, journalist Ronen Bergman went farther in a Yediot Ahronot report, claiming that Netanyahu’s actions endangered the lives of Mossad operatives who were sent on missions that would’ve been futile if they’d known what he was doing.
During the proceedings, several officials testified that they invested heavy resources in attempts to unmask the “enemy” actor working against Israeli interests with the Germans and Egyptians, only to learn from their foreign allies that it was none other than Netanyahu.
In truth, Netanyahu was right that the Israel Navy needs the Drakon Submarine, and he is likely right about other strategic issues. But if he will not defend himself, he is basically admitting that his actions were either wrongful or problematic. Until Netanyahu gives his full explanation, the lingering questions about who was right in this dispute will remain unresolved.